We explore the incentives countries face in trade litigation within the new WTO Dispute Settlement System. Our analysis yields a number of interesting predictions.
Introduction
Don't let the European Union make a game of the WTO system 1 The World Trade Organization (WTO) has celebrated its¯fth anniversary on January 1, 2000. This was overshadowed by the failure of the Third WTO Ministerial Conference in Seattle and two big | though not necessarily representative | agricultural trade disputes between the US and the EU, which have caught most of the public's attention concerning the WTO in recent months. Unfortunately, one of its most important features, the new Dispute Settlement System, has not attracted the attention it deserves.
Although the well{known \banana" and the \hormones" cases have indeed uncovered potential weaknesses of the litigation mechanism, a substantial number of disputes have gone through the process successfully, but largely unnoticed by both the public and the economic profession. Our paper attempts a¯rst systematic description of the mechanism from an economic perspective. We do analyze the WTO Dispute Settlement System as a game and confront the predictions of the theoretical model with the empirical evidence from its¯rst¯ve years.
The WTO's predecessor GATT (General Agreement on Tari®s and Trade) was successful in reducing tari®s, but su®ered from increasing problems with non{tari® restrictions and from a weak and intransparent mechanism to deal with trade disputes. As a consequence, the new WTO established a mandatory and uni¯ed dispute settlement system with much broader jurisdiction. During its¯rst¯ve years a large number of cases made this institution by far the most active part of the new international trade organization. WTO and GATT dispute settlement systems have been studied by political scientists and legal experts, 2 but we are not aware of any other economic explanation of 1 Washington Post, December 1998. This and other advertisements (\If it's going to have any teeth, the World Trade Organization has to cut them on beef and bananas.") refer to the two prominent agricultural con°icts (DS16/27 and DS26/48, see Table 4 ) between the US and the EU, and have appeared in major US newspapers in 1998. In both cases, the WTO decided in favor of the US (the complainant) and requested the EU (the defendant) to change its practice within a period of 15 months. The EU failed to implement the recommendations of the dispute settlement system, and the US subsequently got permission to levy retaliation tari®s on EU products. 2 See for example Croley & Jackson (1995) and Vermulst & Driessen (1995) . A more general perspective on trade legalism is taken by Shell (1995) . For a statistical analysis of GATT disputes see Hudec, Kennedy and Sgarbossa (1993) . While focusing on legal aspects, Jackson (1998) provides interesting information on motives and strategies of litigating parties. Petersmann (1997) contains a detailed analysis of the WTO dispute settlement system and its predecessors from a predominantly legal perspective. This book also comprises a large number of illustrating examples, predominantly under GATT.
the parties' incentives and strategies during the dispute settlement process. Our contribution tries to¯ll this gap by providing a more formal economic analysis of the mechanism.
The WTO's trade litigation procedures di®er not only from dispute handling within the old GATT, but in fact from any previous dispute settlement mechanisms at an international level. Any member country which feels negatively a®ected by another country's trade measure can bring a case before the dispute settlement system and is granted agenda{setting capacity for a large part of the dispute. Unless a bilateral settlement is reached between the countries involved, the case is decided by a panel established by the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB). The panel's verdict can subsequently be appealed by either country. If the report is in favor of the complainant, the defendant country is given a limited period to implement the panel's or appellate body's recommendations.
In case of the defendant's non{compliance after the granted implementation period, the complainant has a right to ask for compensatory trade concessions. An important di®er-ence to dispute settlement under GATT is the elimination of a (factual) unanimity rule.
As a consequence, the WTO dispute settlement system prevents single members from blocking the adoption of the¯nal and binding decision.
The new rules seem e®ective in practice. Already a casual inspection of (nearly) completed cases o®ers some striking empirical regularities. The¯rst fact is the large number of cases which have been brought forward to formal dispute settlement. 185
complaints in¯ve years contrast with less than 300 cases in GATT's 47{year history.
The large number of cases put forward could be a consequence of the system's inability to prevent trade restrictions or nuisance suits, but could also represent a higher con¯dence of negatively a®ected countries in an improved mechanism. The second observation is the apparent popularity of the appellate review. In only 4 cases was the panel report the last instance of the litigation, whereas 24 panel reports were subsequently appealed. 3
The high proportion of appeals does not seem consistent with the appellate review being an additional legal safeguard only. A third observation which deserves further analysis is the mixed success of the system's implementation mechanism. Whether non{compliance is an inherent danger of the system's structure, as the two big agricultural disputes may suggest, is yet an open question. It is clear, however, that a successful implementation stage feeds back into a more powerful procedure. A fourth and last observation is the relatively high ratio of bilateral settlements prior to a panel decision.
Our paper attempts to cast some light on these issues. In particular, it aims to answer 3 These numbers do not include cases for which the granted period to appeal had not elapsed by The importance of strategic interaction between the countries during litigation can be captured by a dynamic game with a succession of sequential moves of the involved players.
Time is an important determinant of both parties' payo®s, because rents and cost accrue during the whole litigation process. In the course of the procedure, the appearance of new information and joining third parties, moreover, can change the outcome of the game. Modeling the multistage setting and the rather complicated structure of the system poses a number of di±cult questions. The focus of our paper clearly lies on¯nding an appropriate way to map the system into a tractable dynamic game which preserves the most important features, rather than on applying sophisticated game theoretic methods.
Although we take an economist's perspective, legal and political aspects are taken into account via their impact on the parties' payo® structure.
Civil suits and international disputes share a number of common features, but di®er considerably in other respects. 4 As the most important di®erence, the payo®s of parties in international litigation accrue predominantly in a non{pecuniary way in the form of political rents and as reputation e®ects. In most instances, therefore, the issue is not a zero{sum game. Due to the limited number of countries in the organization, moreover, the players' characteristics are supposedly well known. Imperfect information within the dispute settlement system is therefore only of secondary importance.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the new dispute settlement mechanism in more detail and highlights its most important di®erences compared to GATT. Section 3 introduces the structure of the game. The core of the paper, section 4, 4 The existing literature on the economic analysis of legal disputes is predominantly concerned with civil suits. An excellent review of this literature can be found in Cooter & Rubinfeld (1989) .
analyses the outcomes of the game. The model's predictions at di®erent stages of the litigation process are compared with a preliminary data set of completed or nearly completed cases. Section 5 provides a summary of the most important¯ndings and concludes.
Dispute settlement under GATT and WTO
The WTO dispute settlement mechanism involves a number of stages, the most important of which are illustrated in Figure 1 , and by a typical completed case | a complaint by Venezuela against US about standards for gasoline | in Appendix B. 5 Obviously, the reason for the procedure, and therefore the¯rst stage of the litigation procedure, is a trade related measure of country D (the future defendant), which seemingly violates WTO law and nulli¯es or impairs the bene¯t of another country C (the future complainant).
While most cases within the WTO dispute settlement system have dealt with preexisting measures, this¯rst step must not be neglected, should the role of the dispute settlement be analyzed for future cases. Ideally, the WTO should prevent countries from taking measures incompatible with WTO law in the¯rst place.
If no bilateral settlement between the two parties can be reached outside WTO procedures, the complainant country C can notify the WTO that it is asking for consultations under the dispute settlement system. This step brings the case to public attention and might attract other countries with similar problems with country D. Countries with a genuine interest into the case can be formally included as third parties in the dispute.
Should no agreement be reached after 60 days, the complainant can request the establishment of a panel, which will usually be granted by the WTO's Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) after at most 30 days. GATT. Finally, the implementation phase has been given more structure. If the losing country does not conform with the panel's recommendations, the complainant has the right to ask for compensation or to take countervailing measures.
Place Figure 1 here
The theoretical model
Our goal is to arrive at a tractable model of the WTO dispute settlement procedure, which nonetheless captures the most important features of the system. The rest of the litigation process is summarized in an appropriate way. We¯rst introduce the participating players and the main stages of the game. The players' payo® structures and the underlying information set are discussed next.
Players
The WTO dispute settlement system has two genuine players: The defendant D is the country which has taken an action (trade restriction) and which is subsequently accused of violating WTO law by the complainant C who¯les the suit. Both countries are represented by their governments, whose interests are not necessarily identical to those of their population. Throughout the analysis, we assume risk neutral players and therefore linear utility. 8
Unlike many private litigation processes, the WTO dispute settlement mechanism allows third parties to participate in the process. Moreover, new information might turn up during the litigation. In our analysis any new relevant information and the appearance of additional countries are summarized in a change in either the litigation costs or in the probability of a certain outcome of both the panel and the appeal decision. The failure of reaching a bilateral agreement is a necessary prerequisite for the next step, and a successful bilateral settlement ends the game at any stage.
Stages of the game and timing of actions
We assume that the decisions of the WTO dispute settlement system are unequivocal, either in favor of the defendant or in favor of the complainant. Precluding the possibility of \intermediate" decisions, we thus merely have to state the resulting payo®s in either case.
Payo® structure
We distinguish three categories of relevant payo® components (as summarized in Table 1 ):
Directly trade related gains and losses, reputation gains and losses, and litigation costs.
about random components of the payo® structure.
Trade related gains and losses may represent welfare gains and losses to a country, but very often are rents and costs accruing to certain interest groups, which directly translate into an implicit political support function. For simplicity, it is assumed that trade related payo®s are proportional to the time the trade measure is in action. Note that | unlike in most civil suits | gains and losses are not symmetric. The game is therefore not a zero{sum{game, even in the absence of reputation costs. If the gains accrue to powerful lobby groups, for example, a trade restriction might well lead to a gain for the defendant in political support which exceeds the complainant's loss. 9 To capture the impact of the duration of the litigation on payo®s, we make a distinction between rents during the process and continuation rents after the conclusion of the litigation process.
During the dispute settlement procedure, the bene¯t rate for the defendant is denoted by g, and the loss rate for the complainant by l. 10 To simplify the analysis, we refrain from discounting bene¯ts and losses during the length of the dispute. Continuation rents and losses, denoted byG andL respectively, accrue after completion of the litigation process. We assume that they are¯nite due to discounting or due to the fact that 11 For simplicity, we assume that they only 9 The U.S. Treasury Department, for example, estimates that the current U.S. FSC regime (DS108, see Table 4 ) generates $2{3 billion in permanent tax savings to U.S. exporters annually. Despite these revenue losses, the US government strongly defends this measure, backed by a powerful lobby of exporters. 10 For a period of time t (given as a fraction of one year), trade related gains and losses are consequently gt and lt. 11 The eagerness of countries to advertise victory or to explain a defeat is obvious from various media reports. In a press statement, the European Union writes: \Until now, there have been only two rulings that have found that certain EU measures are incompatible with WTO provisions. These are the Hormones and Banana cases. It should be remembered that these cases have a long history and involve occur during the panel stage and are therefore adjusted for the probability that the subsequent appellate review yields a di®erent outcome. By undergoing the appellate review stage after a negative panel¯nding, the losing government can signal its determinacy to act in the interest of the involved domestic groups, realizing a reputation gain R C app (R D app ). Note that for the defendant country, the appellate stage is the¯rst and only stage in which it can actively in°uence the process. 12 Reputation costs of non{compliance with the DSB's¯ndings are assumed to increase with time and are denoted by R
) . The fact that the US, but also other countries, complied even in the absence of explicit implementation procedures under GATT in a number of cases provides some support for the existence of these reputation costs. 13 Their structure will depend on the nature of the con°ict.
Litigation costs | i.e. legal and organizational costs of undergoing the dispute settle-
. For simplicity, we assume that litigation costs only matter for the panel stage. They should be interpreted as net additional costs of formal litigation over mutual agreement. The entrance of third parties into the dispute can thus a®ect the process costs directly (sharing of legal fees) or indirectly (higher coordination costs for cooperating countries in bilateral settlements).
----------------------
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Information set and probability structure
The analysis assumes a game under uncertainty, in which the outcomes of the settlement procedure are not known in advance. The probability of the WTO (panel) deciding in favor of the complainant is denoted by ¼. The revision probabilities of a potential appellate review are given by ¹ (= probability of appellate review in favor of defendant, other considerations than trade, such as public health and development assistance." (EU information on the web (Oct. 98)). Concerning the lost US¯lm case (DS44, see Table 4 ), the New York Law Journal (February 26, 1998) cites the dean of Brooklyn Law School by \the loss was small in comparison to other victories the US has been setting so far". 12 Especially in the EU and the US the actions of the governments are closely monitored by the involved interest groups. As the headline of its press release Greenpeace stated: \Greenpeace applauds EU appeal against WTO beef{hormone ruling", Brussels (September 97).
13 Jackson (1998, page 170) argues that \even the most powerful trading entities in the world¯nd it di±cult diplomatically to ignore the results of the dispute settlement process, although in some sense, they could get away with it."
after a panel report in favor of the complainant) and º (= probability of appellate review in favor of complainant, after a panel report in favor of the defendant). An additional restriction is imposed on the probabilities ¹ and º, which allows us to abstract from revision probabilities later in the analysis. We require that the probability ¼ that the panel rules in favor of the complainant equals the overall probability of success for the complainant: 14
We assume symmetric information about all rents. In the context of the WTO dispute settlement, it can be expected that gains and losses from trade restrictions are public knowledge. The same is true, possibly to a lesser extent, of litigation costs and reputation gains and losses. Under symmetric/complete information, both players have identical beliefs at each stage of the game.
Probabilities and payo® elements are not restricted to remain constant during the game. Apart from WTO's decisions, random draws between noti¯cation and the interim report may change the information and cost structure of the game. The probability of a certain outcome is itself random. However, we assume that the best predictor of each payo® component X is always the current value of X, 15 therefore E(t)X(t + s) = X(t), 8s¸0. Random changes are assumed to be uncorrelated. Consequently, we do not have to specify the probability distribution of the payo® components (or of probabilities) in a risk{neutral setting with linear preferences.
The recent Foreign Sales Corporations case (FSC, DS108) between the EU and the US provides a nice illustration for time{dependent payo®s. As will be predicted by our theoretical model below, the US appealed against the negative rulings of the panel.
Shortly afterwards, it withdrew the appeal conditional on its right to¯le a new notice of appeal later on. Most probably the US, hosting of the Third WTO Ministerial Conference in Seattle, did not want to be seen as a non{complying country. After the conference, when public attention was beginning to fade away, the US did indeed renew its appeal.
Apparently, the US experienced a temporary change in its reputation costs.
14 As a numerical example, consider a situation in which the complainant has a high probability ¼ = 0:9 to win. For ¹ = 0:1, condition (1) dictates that º = 0:9, i.e. that the probability of a revision in favor of the complainant after a negative panel¯nding is rather high. For ¼ = 0, which corresponds to an empty threat of the complainant, º = 0 and ¹ can take any value. Similarly for ¼ = 1, which corresponds to a clear violation of WTO law, ¹ = 0 and º is unspeci¯ed. 15 Note that probabilities (but not payo®s) are restricted to lie in the interval [0; 1]. Consequently, there is a probability mass one at both ¼ = 1 and ¼ = 0. This means that once a case is clear, it will stay so forever with probability one.
----------------------
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Theoretical predictions and empirical evidence
The game tree is drawn in its extensive form in Figure 2 . Taking into account the limited information available on the implementation stage, a simpli¯ed treatment will be proposed below. The model is solved backwards to obtain subgame perfect equilibria.
Following the solution path, we present the predictions for the implementation stagē rst, and proceed with an analysis of the appeal stage. The complainant's optimal strategy before the panel and its¯ling decision are considered next. Finally, we analyze the future defendant's decision to introduce a trade measure. A summary of predicted subgame perfect equilibria and the number of cases corresponding to them can also be found in Table 3 .
In the¯rst part of this section, bilateral settlements are ignored, i.e. the results are Each prediction from our model is illustrated with some empirical evidence from WTO dispute settlement complaints¯led during the¯rst¯ve years. This analysis rests on a preliminary database prepared by the authors which comprises relevant information on all complaints¯led during this¯ve year period. Unfortunately, only a fraction of all led suits have been concluded so far, and the vast majority are still at a preliminary stage of the litigation process. Nonetheless, the existing evidence should facilitate an assessment of the predictive power and potential shortcomings of our theoretical model.
For easy reference, all cases mentioned explicitly in this paper are numbered by their o±cial WTO label, and are listed in Table 4 of Appendix C.
The implementation stage
After a negative panel or appellate review ruling, the losing defendant is granted a \rea-sonable implementation period" ¿ . Although negotiations about compensatory concessions can be requested and retaliation measures can be taken in case of the defendant's non{compliance, the role of the complainant is rather passive. Its only choice variable is thus the time¿¸¿ after which it can ask for retaliation.
16 .
The optimal strategies of both players during implementation stage can be summarized in prediction 1.
Prediction 1 (Implementation): The defendant conforms with WTO rulings, if and
where I [t¸¿] is the indicator function. Consequently:
² The optimal strategy of the complainant is to request compensation or retaliation immediately after the completion of the granted implementation period,
² Given the expected strategy of the complainant, the three possible implementation dates are as follows:
{ At the beginning of the implementation period (t = 0), if the reputation costs for non{conforming with WTO law are greater than the trade gains.
{ At the end of the granted implementation period (t = ¿ ), if the impact of compensatory measures is su±ciently large (i.e. if
{ At a timet 1 strictly greater than ¿ for which
Proof: Note that instantaneous trade related gains g and lossed due to retaliation p D are constant, while reputation costs of non{compliance are assumed to be increasing, i.e.
dt¸0 .
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Even if compensation payments are granted by the defendant or if retaliation measures 16 We view compensatory concessions and retaliations as a combined means to punish a non{conforming o®set part of the incurred loss of the defendant's trade restriction, the complainant is unanimously better o® by a direct implementation of the panel's recommendation.
Recall that the trade value of the retaliation measures must not exceed the trade value of incurred losses and the complainant gets no retroactive remedy. Taking into account the fact that the defendant has a strong incentive to delay implementation, the optimal strategy of the complainant country is to request compensation or retaliation as soon as possible.
By the end of 1999, our database contains 11 cases for which information on the implementation status is available. The remaining cases with a¯nal report in favor of the complainant are still within the \reasonable implementation period" granted by the system. While the number of cases is too small to draw reliable conclusions, the clustering of implementation periods, as predicted by our model, is obvious. We can distinguish three di®erent patterns of implementation behavior so far. Two cases ended with an immediate adoption of the panel's or appellate review's recommendations. Both involved relatively minor complaints against the US in which the direct gains for US interest groups can be presumed to be small relative to reputation losses in delaying implementation (DS24 and DS33).
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In seven cases (involving seven di®erent defendants),
19 the losing defendant implemented the panel's¯nding shortly after the \reasonable implementation period" had elapsed, in most cases after 15 months. Once a reasonable period has been speci¯ed (either in the¯nal report or by an arbitrator), none of the countries has an incentive to conform before, and the prospect of retaliation measures may have triggered implementation. The a®ected trade volumes in the seven disputes seem to be in an intermediate range.
In two major agricultural trade disputes between the US as a complainant and the EU as the defendant (DS16/27 and DS26/48), the panel's recommendations were not (fully) implemented even after the period determined by the arbitrator. In both cases the US asked for, and was granted, compensatory measures immediately after the given 18 In the latter case, the US conformed with the panel's recommendations even before the¯nal appellate review report was adopted. The appeal was actually asked by the complainant to get clari¯cations on legal, but not substantive issues. (See also the section on the appellate review below.) 19 The cases are DS2/4 (defendant US), DS8/10/11 (Japan), DS31 (Canada), DS50 (India), DS54/55/59/64 (Indonesia), DS56 (Argentina), and DS69 (EU). Complaint DS2/4 is also illustrated in Appendix C. The implementation of four further ruling (DS18, DS46, DS70, and DS58) are scheduled to be evaluated by the original panel because there is considerable disagreement between the litigants about the implementation status after the implementation period had elapsed.
implementation period had been elapsed. In both cases, available evidence suggests that the political gain for the EU to retain the disputed trade restrictions are high (for public health concerns (\hormones") and the treatment of former colonies (\bananas")).
For the remainder of the analysis, it is assumed that the defendant implements after a period t impl = ¿ , before compensating measures are taken. Any other equilibrium, in particular if the defendant does not comply with a probability°, can be modeled in an analogous way.
The appeal stage
An appeal by one of the parties su±ces to have the issue in question reviewed by the appellate body. \Appellate review" is the equilibrium of the game as long as the expected payo®s for \appeal" are higher than \not appeal" for one litigant. 20 The optimal strategies of the players are as follows.
Prediction 2 (appellate review): A losing defendant appeals even if the chance of a reversal of the panel's¯ndings ¹ is zero. A losing complainant appeals if either
reputation gains R C app or the reversal probability º are strictly greater than zero.
Proof: The claim is easily veri¯ed by inspecting the relevant payo®s of the game (see section A.1 in the Appendix)
There is an overwhelming incentive for the losing government to appeal against the panel report. Consider for example the case of the losing defendant. There are three reasons for our prediction: First and most important, the negative panel¯nding and consequently implementation can be delayed at least for a certain period of time, resulting in an additional trade related rent. Second, the government may secure political support from involved interest groups. Especially for sensitive issues, as for example the EU \hormones" and \banana" cases, domestic political pressure to appeal is substantial.
Finally, there is a small probability ¹ that the panel¯nding is reversed by an appellate review. Consequently the appellate review procedure is likely to be evoked in a large number of cases.
20 The strictly legal function and expertise of the appellate body should ensure unity of interpretation of international law and should rule out that the outcome of an appellate review depends on which country appeals. Once one country appeals, it is virtually costless for the other country to appeal too.
In fact, 24 out of 28 cases which have gone through the panel stage so far have been consequently appealed. 21 In 21 disputes an appellate review was requested by the losing defendant, 22 in one by the losing complainant (DS22), and twice by one or both contestants in disputes with ambiguous panel¯ndings (DS69, DS70). Only four panel reports | one in favor of the defendant (DS44), 23 two in favor of the complainant (DS99, DS126), one ambiguous (DS54/55/59/64) | were directly adopted.
The appellate review fully con¯rmed the¯ndings of the panel report in 21 disputes.
In two cases the appeal led to a reversal of the panel¯ndings (DS60, DS62/67/68), and in one case to a partial reversion (DS103/113). A losing defendant obviously appeals even if hopes to win the case are slim. In the latter three cases, the appellate review seems to have ful¯lled its anticipated role.
In contrast to the model's prediction, the winning complainant appealed against the¯ndings of the panel report in two cases, the two minor textile cases of developing countries against the US already mentioned above (DS24 and DS33). Costa Rica as well as India appealed although the US had already announced its intention to conform with the panel's¯ndings. A closer inspection of the two cases reveals that the complainants were not primarily interested in the substantive outcome of the review, but rather in legal interpretations and clari¯cations of the panel's verdict. The reasoning of the appellate review might have been used to ammunition the parties with (free) legal expertise for future similar trade con°icts.
There is thus empirical support for our prediction that the losing party has an incentive to appeal, in most cases in order to delay the implementation of a negative ruling.
Our analysis implies that the high propensity to appeal will not just be a transitory phenomenon likely to disappear after participants have gained greater clarity about the interpretation of WTO law. The decision to appeal is the result of the incentive structure of the game, and is much less in°uenced by legal uncertainty. Nevertheless, legal aspects during appellate review do play a role. In at least three cases the appellate review has 
Complainant's strategy (noti¯cation and panel request)
After the introduction of a potential trade restriction, the complainant can initiate all moves until a¯rst decision is made by the WTO panel. Its optimal strategy in view of the anticipated reaction of the defendant can be summarized by the following predictions:
Prediction 3a (panel request) : The complainant always requests the panel at the earliest possible date.
Prediction 3b (¯ling decision):
The probability ¼ to win the trial has to exceed a threshold value ¼ before a complaint is¯led, where
A nuisance suit (¼ = 0) is only optimal if the domestic political gain on an appeal after a negative panel decision o®sets both the international reputation loss of losing the case and the direct process cost (R
Prediction 3c (noti¯cation): For ¼¸¼, the complainant noti¯es WTO at the earliest possible date.
Proof: 3a and 3c are obvious, because any delay reduces expected payo®s.
Condition (3) in 3b can be derived from the condition that the complainant's expected payo® in the pre{panel stage has to be greater than the reservation payo® without a complaint (¡lt ¡L, see payo® (A2) in Appendix A.2).
Note that condition (3) hinges crucially on the fact that the complainant can force a decision (and attain R C win ), and that the losing defendant complies after the reasonable period ¿ . In case the latter requirement is not satis¯edL has to be replaced by (1 ¡°)L where°¸0 captures the probability of non{compliance or any additional delays in implementation. This allows an interesting comparison between the dispute settlement under GATT and WTO. The required con¯dence level ¼ depends negatively on both the strength of the implementation mechanism (as measured by (1 ¡°)), and the possibility to reach a favorable decision (and therefore get R C win ). Both components were certainly weaker in expected terms under the GATT system (due to blocking of decisions and the absence of an e®ective implementation procedure) than under the WTO mechanism. It is therefore not surprising that the new dispute settlement system has led to a substantial increase in complaints.
The agenda{setting capacity of the complainant, moreover, should lead to a relatively tight schedule of the dispute settlement system. In most instances, the complainant will not¯le a suit until his chances to win the case are su±ciently high. Nuisance suits cannot be completely excluded in situations in which domestic pressure to sue has a much higher impact on the political support than an expected loss.
In support of prediction 3a, Table 2 shows the distribution of waiting times between noti¯cation and panel request (74 cases). The data show a peak at time periods between 60 (the legal minimum) and 90 days, but also a considerable dispersion. Note that many cases are delayed due to bundling of panel requests for related cases or to holidays. Waiting times below 60 days represent disputes in which the complainant could prove to have noti¯ed the defendant in an acceptable way outside the o±cial procedure. Preliminary evidence suggests that multi{complainant settings lead to longer waiting time between noti¯cation and panel request, presumably due to coordination problems.
Unfortunately, empirical support for the complainant's¯ling decision and hence on prediction 3b is only indirect. For completed cases there is no evidence of nuisance suits.
Among the 44 panel decisions, only two were entirely in favor of the defendant. In both cases (DS22 and DS44) the complainant \lost" because WTO law was not applicable to the trade measure in question. Two other cases led to verdicts in favor of the defendant only after a reversal of the panel's¯ndings by the appellate review (DS60 and DS62/67/68), which means that the cases were far from being clear{cut ex ante. The same is true for four cases with an ambiguous verdict. The remaining 38 cases ended with clear decisions in favor of the complainant.
In the vast majority of cases, the initiation of the trade restriction is unknown. Prediction 3c is thus not directly veri¯able. Moreover, the substantial changes in the structure of the dispute settlement mechanism might have led to a back log and clustering of cases, which complicates the analysis even if the onset of a trade restriction were known.
----------------------
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Introduction of a new trade measure
Given the parties strategies during litigation, does the dispute settlement system discourage the introduction of new trade restrictions? Trade related payo®s for the defending country accrue with certainty during the whole process. Positive expected payo®s are therefore feasible even for a very small probability 1 ¡ ¼ of being able to maintain the trade measure after the conclusion of the dispute. The defendant's optimal strategy can be stated as follows:
Prediction 4 (new trade restriction): The future defendant introduces a trade measure if
When ¼ = 1 (i.e. when both parties are certain of panel¯nding in favor of complainant), the condition for the introduction of a trade restriction is gt + R
The future defendant will introduce the trade restriction, if rents anticipated to accrue during the whole process plus reputation gains from satisfying domestic interest groups exceed the expected reputation loss of a lost trial plus direct process costs.
Proof: Follows directly from the defendant's expected payo® (A1), given in Appendix A.
If domestic pressure to introduce and maintain a trade restriction is larger than (international) reputation losses plus litigation costs, the dispute settlement system cannot prevent a welfare decreasing policy. If we allow for the possibility that non{compliance is the optimal strategy, incentives for introducing trade restrictive measures are stronger yet, even if the probability of losing is one. The agenda{setting capacity of the complainant together with the elimination of blocking should limit the potential direct gains Pecuniary compensation payments between two countries are rather uncommon (but not excluded, e.g. in the form of additional development assistance). Therefore, bilateral settlements will very likely result in a compromise on the trade measure in question. This can also entail that the complainant is granted the right to some compensating trade restrictions. In order to avoid arbitrary assumptions about the nature of the bargaining between the two countries and its possible outcomes, we merely consider the polar cases \trade restriction maintained" and \trade restriction suspended" (see Appendix A.3 for the respective payo®s). For each possible settlement period we compute the sum of payo®s for both polar cases as a proxy for the cooperative value of the settlement. In an analogous way, the players' payo®s from completing the formal dispute settlement procedure are computed as a proxy for the non{cooperative value of the game. 25 Bilateral settlements can be expected to be less clear cut in favor of either party than decisions by the WTO{DSB. The retreating party (either the defendant abolishing the 24 PricewaterhouseCoopers Tax News Network, for example, states in February 1999: \Because WTO{ ordered change in the FSC regime would be prospective in application, and would not likely be e®ective until 2001, it may still be worthwhile to set up a FSC if the start{up costs can be recouped in about one year or less."
25 If payo®s were pecuniary, a nonstrategic bargaining model would assume that disputes will always be settled informally when the cooperative value is perceived to be greater than the non{cooperative value of the game, whereas disputes will¯nally be decided by the WTO, when the former is perceived to be smaller. Although a direct application of this rule is not possible in our much more complex situation, we hopefully still get some information from such exercise.
trade restriction or the complainant giving up the complaint) has to be compensated for potential reputation payo®s, and for the probability that he might have won the case after all. Is the expected panel decision unclear (i.e. 0 < ¼ < 1), the country with the larger absolute gain or loss will have an advantage in bilateral settlements as it is more di±cult for its opponent to o®er su±cient compensation in order to retain its previous position.
For the two polar cases ¼ = 0 and ¼ = 1, only the forgone net (political) reputation gains have to be considered. This is also true after the conclusion of the interim report when the position of the WTO is relatively clear.
Prediction 5a: Bilateral settlements are biased towards the expected outcome of the formal dispute settlement procedure for values of ¼ close to 1 or 0, and especially so after the conclusion of the interim report. An additional variable of interest is the timing of bilateral settlements. In the absence of shocks to the probability and cost structure, there are three windows for bilateral settlements: Between noti¯cation and the establishment of a panel, during the panel stage (when both parties experience direct process costs K D and K C ), but before the completion of the interim report, and¯nally between the interim report (when most uncertainty is resolved) and the circulation of the¯nal panel report. Note that although interim and panel reports hardly ever di®er, there are notable di®erences in payo®s between the two stages, because some reputation costs and gains are only relevant when the DSB's¯ndings become public knowledge, i.e. after the conclusion of the panel report.
The parties can still settle at this point as the content of the interim report is kept con¯-dential. As we have shown above, a potential mutual agreement after the interim report will be biased towards a large reduction in the disputed trade restriction. Moreover, the
win , the more probable is a bilateral settlement at this point. A complainant with a minor (reputation) stake in case of victory will agree to terminate the case at this point in time, in exchange for a su±cient reduction or suspension of the trade measure. 26 After the panel report has been circulated among the WTO{members, there is little scope for a bilateral settlement any more. The implementation of the panel's¯ndings is closely monitored by the DSB. Predications 5b and 5c summarize the likelihood of mutual agreements at di®erent stages of the dispute: Let us assume that trade related payo®s of the disputed restriction are perceived as being 26 Petersmann (1997) argues that the willingness of developing countries to terminate panel proceedings at this stage might re°ect the relatively low gain from winning the case R C win , such that their gain from a bilateral settlement is much larger. However, under the new WTO dispute settlement system only a single case could be observed so far. symmetric, i.e.G =L and g = l. Then the non{cooperative value of the game is
which can be greater or smaller than zero, depending on the payo® components. ----------------------Place Table 3 here
Summary and conclusions
Based on the analysis of the di®erent stages of the WTO dispute settlement system, we can now answer the questions formulated in the introduction and try to draw some conclusions for possible improvements of an international dispute settlement system. First, the preventive power of the WTO dispute settlement system is too limited to discourage new trade restrictions. Even if the probability of winning a case is slim, countries have an incentive to introduce trade restrictions, as rents continue to accrue during the litigation process, and sanctions or compensations for past damages do not exist. On the other hand, the likelihood of a nuisance suit against a well behaved country is rather small. A complaint is only¯led if the probability of winning is su±ciently high.
Second, there is a strong tendency for the losing government to appeal against the panel decision, even if the chances of a revision are slim. An appeal delays the implementation of negative¯ndings and suits the interests of domestic groups. This obviously has consequences for the way the parties perceive the dispute settlement process, as they plan for an appeal right from the start. 27 The appellate review's legal expertise might be used even by winning complainants with a view to accumulate arguments for future disputes on similar issues. Compared to the GATT mechanism, the new dispute settlement system is more e®ective, though. WTO decisions cannot be blocked by a single country, which limits the (political) gains from trade distortions. The relatively tight schedule of the new dispute settlement system (the complainant has control over many timing decisions) reduces the gains and losses of ine±cient trade measures by limiting the period during which they are e®ective. This impact is twofold: It leads to a reduction in the threshold level to sue, and consequently triggers a higher number of justi¯ed complaints. On the other hand, trade distortions may now prove non{pro¯table due to the limited time they can be active, which may reduce the number of potential complaints.
Some features of the new dispute settlement mechanism are well designed while others 27 As Petersmann (1997) points out, this could | especially in the long run | weaken the authority of¯rst{instance panel reports. According to Petersmann (page 188), the strong tendency to appeal an unfavorable panel decision \might even lead to the view that governments be granted the right of direct access to the quasi{judicial appellate body rather than be obliged, without exception, to undergo the time and e®ort of a preliminary panel procedure prior to the¯nal appellate body report."
are not. The complainant's agenda{setting capacity obviously limits the time a trade restriction can remain active. This is, however, partially o®set by the weak enforcement mechanism during the implementation stage. Moreover, the lack of e®ective sanctions for non{compliance with WTO law further weakens the threat of the system, unless non{conforming countries experience sizeable reputation losses. Nevertheless, the great number of dispute settlement cases so far should rather be interpreted as a signal of con¯dence into the new litigation process, than as a failure of the WTO's aim to maintain an internationally liberal trade regime.
The last equality follows from our restricting assumption about revision probabilities in equations (1). Correspondingly, the complainant's expected payo® can be written as
From payo® (A2) the minimum level ¼ to¯le can be computed from the condition © C pre¡panel¸¡L ¡ lt (the reservation utility without complaint).
A.3 Bilateral settlements
The threat point and consequently the non{cooperative value of the game is the sum of the expected payo®s of the reference scenario without bilateral settlements. We also consider the two polar cases \trade restriction maintained" (denoted by a + sign) and \trade restriction suspended" (denoted by a ¡ sign).
After the interim report, the non{cooperative values of the game (conditional on which country has won in the interim report) and the two polar outcomes (as cooperative values) are as follows:
Before interim report, the threat point, and the two polar cooperative outcomes are:
Assume that the disputed trade measure is perceived as a zero game in trade related rents from both parties views, i.e.G =L and g = l. Then the non{cooperative value of the game is 
C Data
The database has been prepared by and is available from Monika BÄ utler upon request. Table 4 contains cases mentioned explicitly in this paper. They are numbered by their o±cial WTO label. Additional information, including panel and appellate review reports, can also be found on the WTO's webpage (www.wto.org/wto/dispute).
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